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ONE JUSTICE FOR ALL: A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH,
BY FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, A
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ROBERT

I.

P.

DAVIDOW*

INTRODUCTION

At a time when most people are talking about revenue sharing' and
other schemes by which the administration of government in the United
States can be decentralized, it may seem strange even to suggest the
possibility of a uniform system of administration of criminal justice by
the federal courts. 2 Nevertheless, the time has come to look beyond
mere tradition and to ask some pertinent questions, the answers to
which logically suggest the desirability of an exclusive, uniform system
*Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. This article is a substantial revision and
condensation of an unpublished paper entitled Exclusive, Uniform Federal Justice, prepared while
the author was doing graduate work at the Harvard Law School, 1968-1969. The author wishes to
acknowledge the very great assistance provided by the following persons in the preparation of the
statistical analyses referred to in notes 17-20, infra: Dr. Dwane Anderson (member of the faculty,
Department of Mathematics, Texas Tech University), Mrs. Mary Whiteside (graduate student,
Department of Mathematics, Texas Tech University), and Robert Haynes (Computer Center,
Texas Tech University).
'See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 167 (1971) (State of the Union Address by President Nixon).
2
Many persons will not, of course, be sympathetic to the general proposition that the federal
government ought to be strengthened in any way. A common attitude has been expressed as
follows: "We believe that strong state and local governments are essential to the effective functioning of the American system of federal government; that they should not be sacrificed needlessly to
leveling, and sometimes deadening, uniformity.
... Conference of Chief Justices, Report of the
Committee on Federal-StateRelationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions, in WE THE STATES
367, 399 (Va. Comm'n on Constitutional Gov't 1964). See Liebmann, Charteringa NationalPolice
Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1176, 1180 (1970), in which the author concludes his criticism of the study draft
of the proposed new federal criminal code by saying in part: "It cannot be said that the Bar and
the public have not been warned. This study draft, if enacted, will be the charter of a national police
force, with all that this implies. Members of the Bar, state and local officials and the public cannot
make known their views about its provisions too soon." In addition, see Armstrong, The Proposed
National Court Assistance Act, 56 A.B.A.J. 755, 759 (1970), in which Judge Armstrong states:
I am confident that from a lack of knowledge of our dual system of courts many
persons do not realize that the Tydings bill is another step-and a long one-toward a
unitary judicial system in America. If that is the ultimate objective, it should be approached openly and constitutionally. The architects of our system of courts were judiciously and bitterly opposed to a unitary system for the same reasons that it should be
rejected today. The concentration of excessive power invites corruption and collapse.
If the proposals for recodification of the federal criminal code and for a court assistance act
elicit these kinds of responses from Mr. Liebmann and Judge Armstrong, it may be anticipated
that the proposal contained in this article will elicit similar but perhaps more vigorous responses.
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of federal criminal justice in the United States. While I have no illusions
about the force of logic in the development of the law,3 and, while I
realize that as a practical matter there is little likelihood that the proposal contained in this article will have any immediate impact on the
administration of justice in the United States, I nonetheless proceed in
the hope that some serious consideration will be given to issues that have
long been ignored.4
At the outset the reader may be tempted to criticize the scope of
the proposal. He may find it under-inclusive since most of the civil law
is excluded from consideration, or he may find it over-inclusive since the
proposal deals with all forms of civil commitment as well as with incarceration under the criminal law.
My response to the criticism of under-inclusiveness is, first, that in
some non-criminal areas there is already a measure of uniformity
among the states. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code has
been enacted in all states except Louisiana.5 Second, the criminal law
and other forms of civil commitment are more important in my estimation than other areas of the civil law because the former endanger the
lives and liberty of people.
In response to the criticism of over-inclusiveness, I would point to
the interrelationship between the criminal law and civil commitment.
Both may result in the deprivation of liberty. Also, persons who have
committed criminally proscribed acts may be civilly committed initially
through the exercise of discretion by the police or prosecutor,' or they
may be so committed after an acquittal by reason of insanity.7 Finally,
'One need only recall the following passage from THE

COMMON LAW:

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (1881).
'The possibility of central administration of the criminal law has not been totally ignored. See,
e.g., R. TUGWELL, MODEL FOR A NEW CONSTITUTIuN (1970).This proposed comprehensive
revision of the Constitution of the United States would create a judicial council at the national
level, which "shall examine, and from time to time cause to be revised, civil and criminal codes;
these, when approved by the Judicial Assembly, and if not rejected by the Senate, shall be in effect
throughout the United Republics." Id. at 76.

51 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE iv (2d ed. 1970).
'See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 175 (1967).
7

1n some jurisdictions, commitment automatically follows acquittal by reason of insanity. E.g.,
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juvenile delinquency proceedings are often described as "civil" 8 in spite

of their similarity to criminal proceedings.
Conceptually, the criminal law and civil commitment are poten-

tially related because of proposals, offered primarily by those sympathetic to a virtually deterministic view of human behavior, that the

criminal law be eliminated as such and replaced by a system of incarceration of dangerous persons.' I do not now subscribe to such proposals,
but any proposed amendment to the United States Constitution that

seeks to transfer the administration of the criminal law to the federal
government must take into account the possibility that some states will

seek to implement such proposals in the future.

II.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE

There are many ways in which one might approach the problem of

administration of justice in the United States today. I prefer to approach it from the standpoint of one who is newly arrived in this country
and is unfamiliar with its historical developments. Such an individual
observes the administration of justice among the several states and the

rather substantial disparities both in the substantive criminal law and
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1953); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1964). Of course, such provisions
for automatic commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity may be constitutionally suspect to the extent that they do not provide the person committed with the same guarantees that
are provided to one who is otherwise civilly committed. See United States v. Marcey, 440 F.2d
281 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Cf. McNeil v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 92 S.Ct. 2083 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 2 S.Ct. 1845 (1972); Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
sFor example, in Texas the Statutory provisions dealing with juvenile delinquency are found
in the civil statutes. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1 (1971). Moreover, appeals from
decisions of the courts in juvenile delinquency proceedings are taken to a Court of Civil Appeals,
rather than to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. art. 2338-1, § § 21 (1971).
'See Katz, Dangerousness:A TheoreticalReconstruction of the CriminalLaw, 19 BUFFALO
L. REV. 1 (1969). In Seney, The Sibyl at Cumae-Our Criminal Law's Moral Obsolescence, 17
WAYNE L. REV. 777 (1971), the author rejects both the concept of moral blameworthiness and the
concept of mental illness; instead "[w]hat is relevant is identifying those institutions, groups and
individuals with strategically placed power to affect the major factors contributing to any identified
harm, and the allocation of responsibility to reduce such harm, not only future similar harms but
also the current harms." Id. at 821 (footnote omitted). Unfortunately the author, though stressing
group responsibility, never seems to deal with the problem of the individual who may indeed be a
threat to society and whose incarceration may seem imperative. See also Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 470-471 (1897).
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in criminal procedure.'" He observes also the ease of travel from one
state to another and, with the help of a friend learned in the law, discovers the constitutional right to travel freely without interference by the
states." Such an individual undoubtedly finds it difficult to understand
why the several states should be permitted to enforce their own codes
of criminal law and procedure. He finds it difficult to understand why,
for example, it is lawful to gamble in Nevada 2 but unlawful to do the
same thing in the neighboring state of California 3 or why a first-time
possessor of one ounce of marijuana can be imprisoned for life in
Texas 4 but only jailed for fifteen days in New Mexico. 5 Can the system
be adequately explained to this stranger? Suppose, for example, that the

stranger is one who is unimpressed with the force of tradition. Are there
other persuasive arguments which can be advanced in support of the
present system? As the following discussion indicates, I believe that the
answer is "no."

One argument that is sometimes heard in support of the present
system is that the criminal law is and should remain a matter of local
concern'-that is, that the people of any given region know best what
I0Regarding the substantive criminal law, compare, e.g., N.H. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 583-A:2
(Supp. 1971) (no burglary where actor has permission to enter), with ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13302 (Supp. 1971-1972), construed in McCreary v. State, 25 Ariz. 1, 212 P. 336 (1923) (burglary
conviction proper where actor had permission to enter).
With regard to criminal procedure, compare, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05
(1966) (accused entitled to indictment in all felony cases), with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(a)(1), (2)
(accused entitled to indictment only in capital cases).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995 (1972) (alternative holding); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88 (1971) (alternative holding); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941) (Douglas, Black,
Murphy
& Jackson, JJ., concurring).
12NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.010-.670 (1967).
3

CAL. PENAL CODE § 330 (West 1970).
11TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 725b § 1(14), 2(a), 23(a) (Supp. 1972).
"5N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-11-23B(l) (Supp. 1972).

16This argument is implicit in much recent discussion of problems of federalism. See, e.g., Bell,
Federalism in CurrentPerspective, 1 GA. L. REV. 586 (1967); Clark, CriminalJusticein America,
46 TEXAS L. REV. 742 (1968).
It is also interesting to note that many criminal law reformers assume that the
criminal law is primarily a matter for the states and that diverse local attitudes should
be reflected in the criminal law: "It should be noted, however, that it was not the purpose
of the Institute to achieve uniformity in penal law throughout the nation, since it was
deemed inevitable that substantial differences of social situation or of point of view
among the states should be reflected in substantial variation in their penal laws." Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1427 (1968).
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the content of the criminal law should be. The difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes both that there are substantial disagreements
about the substantive criminal law and that these are organized along
state lines. Although much remains to be learned about the attitudes of
people across the country regarding crime,17 the empirical data that are
available suggest that the second assumption is not justified. Across the
nation, the differences in attitude with respect to some of the traditional
common law crimes are apparently not very great. 8 With regard to such
controversial issues as the proposal to legalize the use of marijuana,
there are significant differences in attitides, but, to the extent that these
differences are related to geographical distributions of the population,
The new Code will scarcely be considered worthwhile if its enactment requires any place
or region unnecessarily to conform to national standards not their own. Recall, too, that
experience with the Carolina [sic] shows that a humanitarian rule in one region may be
baneful in another. To be sure we cannot remain a single nation unless we give due
regard, in all places and in all regions, to the fundamental human rights possessed by
all our citizens. But standards of personal conduct do vary from region to region. Due
attention, therefore, must be given in the process of codification to the legitimate demands of our nation's diversity.
McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal
Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 711-12 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
"7Apparently, no one has attempted to conduct a state-by-state survey of attitudes towards
the substantive criminal law. The reason may be the expense; one estimate, made in 1969 by
Professor Lloyd Ohlin of the Harvard Law School, was that such a survey would cost about
$400,000.
One is left with a number of nationwide surveys that permit only regional comparisons and
with a few individual state surveys. These surveys tend to deal with specific, narrow issues, and
since they were conducted at different times, using different sampling techniques, and asking
questions in different forms, it is difficult to compare the results of one survey with another.
Portions of five public opinion surveys were analyzed statistically in connection with the
writing of this article. The responses to four questions relating to unlawful homicide, larceny of
five dollars, larceny of fifty dollars, and racial discrimination in the sale of a home were taken
from National Opinion Research Center, Victimization Study, summer 1966 (unpublished data at
Univ. of Chicago). The responses to a question relating to the possible legalization of the use of
marijuana were taken from Gallup International, Inc., Poll on Legalization of Marijuana Use,
November 1969 (unpublished data in Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamston, Mass.).
The responses to a question regarding legal penalties for possession of marijuana were in a telephone conversation with Robert D. Coursen, Research Manager, Minneapolis Tribune, Feb.
1972. The responses to a question regarding penalties for possession and use of marijuana were
taken from Belden Associates, Report No. 784, Nov. 23, 1969 (unpublished material on file at
Belden Associates, Dallas, Tex.). Finally, the responses to a question relating to possible penalties
for the possession and use of marijuana were taken from Field Research Corp., California Poll,
January, 1971 (unpublished data at Institute of Governmental Studies, Univ. of California at
Berkeley).
"An analysis of the 1966 Victimization Study, supra note 17, shows no statistically significant
differences, either within regions or among regions, regarding attitudes towards the seriousness of
an unlawful homicide.
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the most significant common factor seems to be the size of the colnmunity rather than state boundaries. In other words, persons who live
in large urban areas in one part of the country seem to have more in
common with urban dwellers in other parts of the country regarding
attitudes toward the criminal law than they have with people in the rural
areas of the states in which they live. 9 The majority of the inhabitants
of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, Minnesota, for example, seem to
have attitudes toward the legal status of marijuana which are more

similar to the attitudes of most persons in other large cities than to
the attitudes of most persons in rural Minnesota.2 1
Opposition to the centralization of the control of the criminal law
based on a desire to protect local interests thus makes little sense. Even
under the present system of criminal justice there are many local com"With the exception of the California Poll (Field Research Corp., supra note 17), all of the
surveys analyzed show differences in attitudes, to the extent that differences exist, according to
size of community. This is most pronounced with regard to large cities. For example, an analysis
of the responses to the four questions from the 1966 Victimization Study, supra note 17, shows no
statistically significant differences in attitudes of persons in the ten largest Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas. Also, the analysis of the 1969 Gallup Poll (Gallup International, Inc., supra note
17) regarding legalization of marijuana shows no significant differences in attitudes among inhabitants of cities over 500,000 population.
IOAn analysis of the Minnesota Poll of January 1972 (Minneapolis Tribune, supra note 17)
regarding attitudes toward penalties for possession of marijuana shows a highly significant difference among the attitudes of persons in communities of three different sizes in Minnesota. Similarly,
an analysis of the 1969 Texas Poll (Belden Associates, supra note 17) regarding attitudes towards
legalization of marijuana shows a highly significant difference among the attitudes of persons in
communities of four different sizes. The Gallup Poll analysis (Gallup International, Inc., supra
note 17) shows a significant difference in attitudes among different-size communities in the East,
Mid-West, and South. No such difference appears in the West.
Ignoring for the moment the results of the California Poll (Field Research Corp., supra note
17), one may try to explain this apparent discrepancy between the West and the rest of the country
in the Gallup Poll by reference to the greater net migration to the West. Between 1960 and 1970
the West had a net gain in population by migration of 10.2%, whereas the Northeast gained only
0.7%, the North Central lost 1.5%, and the South gained 1.1%. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

35 (1971). In other words, the migration

to the West may have led to greater mixing of persons with different attitudes and backgrounds in
many communities, regardless of size. Moreover, if the West provides a clue to the general effect
of migration on distribution of attitudes, it would seem that as more and more people in our society
migrate to other parts of the country, regional differences in attitude will become even smaller.
Increased travel and the mass media may also contribute to a lessening of regional differences in
attitudes.
The results of the analysis of the California Poll are inconsistent with the results of the other
four analyses and are difficult to summarize. There is no discernible pattern in the results. However, there are significant differences among regions and counties within California, and therefore
there is nothing in the California results that is inconsistent with the proposition that differences
in attitudes towards crime do not follow state boundaries.
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munities in which most of the adults have attitudes towards the criminal
law that are probably not going to be reflected in the laws of the states
in which they live, because persons in other communities (larger and
smaller) have different views which claim the support of a majority of
the adults in the state.2 ' This situation is no different from that which
would prevail if a uniform, exclusive federal criminal code were
adopted. The views of a majority in some communities would be reflected in the federal law and, of necessity, the views of a majority in
some other communities would not be so reflected.
Another argument that has been raised in support of the present
system is the desirability of experimentation by the states. It is true that
the states have experimented not only in the field of the substantive
criminal law, but also in the area of criminal procedure, but whether
these experiments on balance have been helpful rather than harmful is
debatable. For example, some persons may applaud experiments in the
area of abortion laws, 22 but these same persons may not be thrilled at
the prospect of the imposition of capital punishment for the offense of
rape.?3 In the field of criminal procedure, some persons may be impressed with the state experimentation that led to the adoption of prosecution by information, 24 but they may not be happy with the extension
of that system in Florida. (In Florida not only has the grand jury indictment become unnecessary in non-capital cases, but also the process of
information has made it possible for the state attorney to bring a case
to trial without the intervention of anyone-grand jury, magistrate, or
anyone else.25 Whether this Florida procedure represents true improvement is questionable.)
21

This presupposes that community attitudes vill be reflected in the actions of those who
represent these communities in the state legislatures. Some contend that this is not what happens-that special interest groups actually determine the actions of representatives in the legislature. See Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

119, 135 (J. Douglas ed. 1971). Even if the latter contention is correct, the situation is not likely
to be worse under a federal system of criminal law. At the national level public attention may be
focused on the actions of special interest groups, and those seeking to minimize the influence of
such groups may be able more effectively to organize opposition.
nE.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
1E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (Supp. 1972). But see Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726
(1972).
2
California's system of prosecution by information was upheld against constitutional attack
in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
"Under Florida statutes an arresting officer must bring the arrested person before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§901.06, .23 (Supp. 1972). Under FLA. R.
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In addition, it is possible to argue that experiments by the federal

government on the national level are likely to be superior in operation
to state experiments. If an experiment is a success at the national level,

the whole country can benefit from it immediately. However, if the
experiment turns out to be an unhappy one, this fact will be forcefully

brought home to all in the country, and the likelihood is that remedial
legislation will be enacted speedily.

Even if it were decided that some form of local experimentation
were still necessary in the context of the uniform federal system, it
would still be possible for the federal government to experiment. An

appropriate place, for example, would be in the District of Columbia.
Such experimentation would be subject to the scrutiny of Congress and
could be controlled rather closely by that body.
On the other hand, experiments within a state, even if successful,
will not immediately affect jurisdictions in which the experiments are
not tried. If the experiment turns out to be unwise, however, it is possible that little pressure will be applied to the state legislators to remedy

the situation because of the inability of the voters to focus their attention
on numerous governmental units at the same time. Thus it is possible
that the experiment in one state may be ignored because of more pressing difficulties at the national level and elsewhere. Unfortunately legislation, such as the Texas peace bond," may remain on the books for
some time.
P. 3.122 the magistrate before whom an arrested person is brought must advise the arrested
person of his right to a preliminary hearing; the arrested person may waive the preliminary hearing
in writing. It would thus seem that an arrested person in Florida has a right to a preliminary
hearing. However, in the case of Palmieri v. State, 198 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1967), the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed a conviction despite the failure of the police to take the defendant before a
magistrate. In affirming the conviction the court said:
It (the preliminary hearing) is not an indispensable prerequisite to the filing of an
information . . . and is not a necessary step in criminal proceedings ....
"A prosecution may be instituted and maintained regardless of whether such a hearing is or is not
held, and regardless of whether probable cause to hold the accused for trial is or is not
found."
198 So. 2d at 634-35 (citations omitted).
6
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7.01-.17 (1966). For a discussion of the constitutionality
of the Texas peace bond procedure see Davidow, The Texas Peace Bond-Can It Withstand
ConstitutionalAttack?, 3 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 265 (1972).
Another example of a questionable state procedure which has remained on the statute books
for years is the Michigan "one-man grand jury." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943-.946(2) (Supp. 1972).
For a discussion of this "one-man grand jury," see R. Davidow, Exclusive, Uniform Federal Justice
39, April, 1969 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library).
CRIM.

1972]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Still another argument that may be advanced in support of the
present system of state administration of criminal justice is the fear that
concentration of power over the criminal law in the federal government
will result in tyranny.2 However, the fear of federal tyranny is not a
sufficient reason for avoidance of a uniform system of federal criminal
law. First, there is the historical question whether the United States
Government has been more guilty of tyranny than the individual states.
One cannot answer this question without making certain assumptions
about what constitutes tyranny in the context of the criminal law, but
if one accepts John Stuart Mill's thesis, 8 the enforcement of laws
against prostitution,2 9 possession and use of marijuana, 0 and vagrancy3 are examples of state action that may be characterized as
tyrannous. Although there have been similar instances of enforcement
of questionable laws by the federal government, 32 it is still difficult to
say that the federal government has been worse than the states.
There is perhaps a more fundamental question with respect to the
fear of federal tyranny; this relates to the question of checks and bal"Fear of concentration of power in the federal government goes back, of course, to the original
debates over ratification of the Constitution. For example, during the debates, some persons
expressed fear that the federal courts would entirely supplant the state courts. See Mason,
Objections, in THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 882 (S. Scott ed. 1898);
Letter by James Winthrop, Dec. I1, 1787, in id. at 518.
28J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (2d ed. 1863). Mill's thesis was essentially that the government
should not interfere with the individual unless the individual's conduct is likely to harm the rest of
society.
"E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
3E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 398.02(12) (1960); id. § 398.22 (Supp. 1972).
31
E.g., id. § 856.02 (1965), which was, in effect, declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Florida, 92 S. Ct. 848 (1972). The decision of the Florida

Supreme Court was vacated and remanded in the light of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 92
S. Ct. 839 (1972), in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional, on grounds of vagueness,
a Jacksonville city ordinance which was very similar to the Florida statute. It is interesting to note
that in Smnith, the Florida Supreme Court had chosen to ignore a finding of unconstitutionality by
a United States district court in Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. Shevin v. Lazarus, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
32
The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), is an example of an act of Congress which

interferes with the rights of individual citizens-in this case the right of free speech under the first
amendment. Another federal statute which intrudes upon the rights of individuals is Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970), which criminally proscribes "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces." Apart
from questions of vagueness, this section may be construed to reach conduct which, under Mill's
thesis, should remain free of governmental control. E.g., United States v. Mueller, 40 C.M.R. 862
(1969) (possession and transfer of marijuana, off post, off duty).
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ances. 33 The argument in the context of the criminal law is that since

neither the federal government nor the states have total control over the
criminal law, each may exercise a check upon the other. It is true that

the federal government has exercised some control over the states in the
area of the criminal law. The fourteenth amendment of the United

States Constitution has restrained the states in the development of criminal procedure 34 and, through the first amendment rights of free
speech,35 press,36 and association 37 has limited the enforcement of
their substantive criminal laws. The presumption that the field 'of criminal law is primarily within the states' domain has served as a restraining
influence upon the exercise of federal power in the area of substantive
criminal law. 38 However, if it is assumed that there is a need to provide
a system of checks and balances in the field of criminal law, it does not
follow that the present system should be maintained. It is possible to

conceive of a federal system of criminal law in which checks and balances are maintained-checks and balances in addition to those which
3The theory of separation of powers-or checks and balances-was certainly thought to be
incorporated into the Constitution by those who argued for its ratification. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 57, at 299 (H. Lodge ed. 1899) (J. Madison).
3A majority of the United States Supreme Court has apparently adopted the "selective
incorporation" theory of interpretation of the fourteenth amendment and has in effect applied most
of the restrictions found in the Bill of Rights to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for the production of witnesses for the defendant); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (freedom from self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (proscription
of cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (dictum)
(prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (alternative
holding) (public trial and notice of charges); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial
tribunal). That the "selective incorporation" theory still commands the support of a majority of
the members of the United States Supreme Court in spite of four new justices is illustrated by the
concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Johnson v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1620, 1635 (1972).
"E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act unconstitutional because in conflict with first amendment, as made applicable to states through fourteenth
amendment).
3
6E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (contempt conviction of sheriff for issuing news
release critical of judge's action regarding grand jury unconstitutional).
37E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (municipal ordinance requiring
organizations in city to file list of names of members unconstitutional).
31See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1241, 1958 (unpublished materials, in Harvard
Law School Library).
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exist by virtue of a tripartite government consisting of the executive, the
legislature, and the judiciary. For example, it would be possible to
provide a council of representatives whose sole responsibility would be
the criminal law. Such a council might make recommendations to the
Congress concerning the need for amendments in the fields of criminal
law, criminal procedure, and civil commitment and might also be given
the authority to veto the criminal laws passed by Congress if the vast
majority of council members were convinced of the desirability of the
veto. It might also be given the power to require the Congress to vote
on a proposal if a great majority of the council members believed that
Congress was not properly taking the initiative in bringing about needed
reforms of the law in this area.
Another aspect of the fear of federal tyranny is the fear that extension of the exercise of federal power in the criminal law field would
produce a national police force 9 that would endanger the freedom of
all. Even if it is assumed that a national police force would pose a
serious threat to individual liberty, the creation of an exclusive, uniform
system of criminal justice would not necessarily lead to the creation of
a national police force, since the enforcement of the federal law could
be accomplished by an act of Congress authorizing and requiring local
police to enforce it. A federal ombudsman might be created to insure
compliance by the local police.
Thus far it appears that there are many logical reasons for the
adoption of a uniform system of federal criminal justice, whereas mere
tradition is the primary basis of the present system." However, I believe
that there is another important reason for the adoption of a federal
system: the discrepancy between theory and practice in the present system of criminal justice. While there has always been, and always will
be, some difference between practice and theory, there is considerable
room for improvement. For example, although the presumption that
everyone knows the law is necessary to avoid encouraging people to be
ignorant of the law, 4 it is an extremely unrealistic presumption when
"See Liebmann, supra note 2, at 1180.
"One should keep in mind Holmes' famous statement regarding the limitations of history in
the development ofjudge-made law: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past." Holmes, supra note 9, at 469. If this is true of judicial action, it is even more true of
legislatures, which have a greater duty to keep abreast of current needs.
41
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 925 (2d ed. 1969).
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there are some fifty-one different codes of criminal law and procedure.
The presumption would be much more realistic if there were only one
system of criminal law and procedure. Moreover, it would be somewhat
easier for the Supreme Court to bring about uniformity in the interpretation of the law if it were dealing with a single jurisdiction over which
it could exercise its supervisory powers.42
This is not to suggest that establishment of an exclusive, uniform
system of criminal justice at the national level would be a panacea. In
particular, such a system would be no better than the persons entrusted
with the responsibility of making it work. Perhaps, therefore, attention
should also be given to the possibility of change in the mode of selection
(and perhaps training) of federal judges. In any event, recognition that
perfection is not likely to result from implementation of this proposal
should not lead to its rejection.
III.

SOME SPECIFICS OF CHANGE

Thus far an attempt has been made to show, in a general way, the
desirability of a uniform system of criminal justice at the federal level.
There cannot be a complete discussion of the broad issue of the desirability of such a system, however, without some consideration of what
such a system might look like. What follows, therefore, is an example
of the kind of constitutional amendment that could bring about the
change discussed above. Although it is merely illustrative, it does deal
with some specific issues; hence it is necessary to state here the assumptions on which this particular proposal is based.
Assumptions

One assumption is that the criminal law is distinguished from other
forms of social control by the moral condemnation of society that accompanies conviction and by the notion that the criminal law ought not
"See. e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). Both of these decisions have been modified by 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1970).
Of course the fact that the Supreme Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the federal

courts does not mean that there is total uniformity. For example, in the area of the insanity
"defense" the circuits have indeed developed their own tests. Compare, e.g., United
Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (modified Model Penal Code), with United States v.
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Model Penal Code,) and Pope v. United States, 372
F.2d (8th Cir. 1967) (M'Naghten and "irresistible impulse" tests), vacated on other grounds,
651 (1968).

States v.
Brawner,
F.2d 710
392 U.S.
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to be applied to one who is not morally blameworthy." Another as-

sumption is that one of the highest values that a society can protect is
freedom from unwarranted conviction of crime and its concomitant

stigmatization. It is also assumed that deprivation of physical liberty
-whether

it be in the form of incarceration in a prison, hospital, train-

ing school, or other confinement facility (however euphemistically described)-is as serious a consequence for the individual as incarceration
based on conviction of crime and that the same standards of due process

that protect the individual when the government seeks to convict him
ought to apply when an attempt is made to incarcerate him civilly. 4

Some of the implications of these assumptions will now be explored. The criminal law would have no reason to exist if man did not

have, to some extent, the capacity to make choices and to act upon
them. Extreme determinism would remove any notion of moral blame-

worthiness and would make the criminal law obsolete. I do not subscribe
to that theory, believing, as others have suggested4 5 that one can accept
the findings of modern psychiatry, psychology, and sociology without

giving up the notion that man can control his actions to some degree.
Even if evidence is some day gathered to show that the determinists

are right, there will still be a need to incarcerate some very dangerous

persons even if the process is described as "civil." 4 Therefore, the pro-

posal relates to civil commitment as well as to conviction of crime.
Indeed the problems of lack of uniformity discussed above would be
3
See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404-05 (1958).
In addition, see P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT (1963), in which the author states:
"In support of my view I urge that crime and punishment are concepts which in our ordinary
thinking are inextricably intertwined with the notion of guilt or blame." Id. at 70.
"See Davidow, supra note 26.
ISE.g., S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY-COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? 14-15 (1962).
In addition, see P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 62 (1963):
Yet the reverse side of the coin of guilt is that of merit. And it is a curious fact that the
psychiatrists who preach so loudly that there is no such thing as guilt are not heard to
say that there is no such thing as merit. Rather do they seek and enjoy recognition of
their special insights. I am not criticising them for this. But I urge that such an attitude
is quite inconsistent with a genuine belief that all mental processes are the product of
inescapable and inexorable forces. The same attitude is reflected in the more technical
psychiatric writings. Here eminent psychiatrists discuss their cases and develop their
reasons for preferring one mode of diagnosis and treatment to another. They explain
why they made a particular choice, but they never offer an explanation suggesting that
they were driven to the choice by a combination of their own hereditary and environmental influences.
"6See Katz, supra note 9.
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reproduced in a much worse form (despite uniformity of the criminal
law) if some but not all states decided to process through the civil courts
those who are now prosecuted criminally.
Moreover, while the criminal law continues to exist there will continue to be a need for the civil commitment of some persons acquitted
on the ground of insanity. Indeed, the jury's assumptions regarding
initiation of civil commitment proceedings upon acquittal by reason of
insanity may affect the jury's decision to acquit a defendant in a case
in which the defendant obviously has substantial problems of control
and in which the jury believes that the defendant is a danger to society.,
Thus the problems of conviction and civil commitment are very substantially intertwined, and any scheme that alters the allocation of powers
in the federal system with respect to one but not the other is bound to
create great difficulties.
Another assumption relates to the matter of distribution of powers
within the federal system and the need for checks and balances. Those
who assembled in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the Constitution assumed that Montesquieu was correct in suggesting a division of powers
within the government. 8 They believed that unrestrained power could
lead to tyranny. (They also probably assumed that the general government would not become involved in providing an exclusive, uniform
criminal code.49 This was very likely the product of another assumption,
that the criminal law was a matter of purely local concern. That latter
assumption may no longer be valid.) Like the Founding Fathers, I
assume that the exercise of unrestrained power will lead to tyranny; this
assumption explains in part the restrictions placed upon the Congress
in the proposed constitutional amendment."0
Another assumption is that an exclusive, uniform federal criminal
and civil commitment code would work. (The question of political acceptability is another matter.) Some assurance of the feasibility of the
proposal is provided by the successful Canadian experience. The British
4

,See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 94 (1967).
"aSee THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 299 (H. Lodge ed. 1899) (J. Madison).

"See id. No. 82, at 512 (A. Hamilton).
50Although I would thus continue and perhaps extend the system of checks and balances, I
nevertheless believe that the policy decisions regarding the criminal law and incarceration generally
ought to be made by a publicly elected body. I therefore disagree with the basic approach taken in
R. TUGWELL, supra note 4, which provides for enactment of criminal codes by a Judicial Council
appointed by the Principal Justice of the United Republics.
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North America Act of 186711 gives the Canadian government the power
to provide a criminal code for the entire dominion;12 that government
also has the power to appoint and to pay the salaries of some of the
judges who try cases under the code.53 Certain difficulties have arisen,
but they can be traced to the failure to give to the central government
the entire power over criminal law. 4 The Canadian experience thus
reinforces the arguments for uniformity.
A final assumption relates to the method of change. Although a
strong argument can be made that Congress now possesses the power55
to create a uniform system of criminal justice at the national level,
5'30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
5
rrhe central government has the power to make laws with respect to "Criminal Law, except
the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal
Matters." Id. § 91(27).
" "The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County
Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick." Id. § 96. "The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the Superior, District,
and County Courts (except the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), and of
the Admiralty Courts in Cases where the Judges thereof are for the Time being paid by Salary,
shall be fixed and provided by the Parliament of Canada." Id. § 100.
"See Leigh, The Criminal Law Power: A Move Towards Functional Concurrency?, 5
ALBERTA L. REV. 237 (1967).
The provinces have the power to deal, for example, with problems of property and civil rights
(30-31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(13)), and more specifically, highways (O'Brien v. Allen, 30 Can. S. Ct. 340,
342-43 (1900) (dictum); see Mann v. The Queen, 56 D.L.R.2d 1 (1966); O'Grady v. Sparling, 25
D.L.R.2d 145 (1960)), they also have the power to enforce their legislation in these areas with fines
and imprisonment. 30-31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(15). The result is that the provinces have involved
themselves to some extent in the criminal law through the exercise of this regulatory power and,
of course, diversity among the provinces has developed. Melnik, Provincial'Supplementary' Legislation, 15 FAC. L. REv. 48, 53 (1957). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has been forced
to devote some of its time to such nice questions of constitutional interpretation as whether the
central government, in enacting some obstensibly criminal statute, is really trying to usurp the
power of the provinces over property. See Murray, Economic Activity Under Criminal Law, 15
FAC. L. REv. 25 (1957).
"The argument that Congress now possesses the power to provide a uniform system of
criminal justice to be administered at the national level is presumably based on the commerce
clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, and the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
The arguments based on the commerce clause are best summarized in the recent case of Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). In Perez the Court, with only Justice Stewart dissenting,
held that Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891-96 (1970), is constitutional. The Court concluded that petitioner's "loan sharking" activities could be criminally proscribed by Congress because Congress had found that such activities affected interstate commerce,
even though there was apparently no evidence that the activities of petitioner in this particular case
affected commerce. The Court stated that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class
is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to 'excise, as trivial, individual
instances' of the class." 402 U.S. at 154 (emphasis in original). Awareness of the implications of
the decision is illustrated by the Court's inclusion of a statement made during the debates over the
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there are at least two reasons for preferring a constitutional amendment.
First, a constitutional amendment could institutionalize an additional

check on congressional authority in this area and thus provide protection against federal tyranny. Second, unlike a mere act of Congress, a
proposed amendment would not be subject to the criticism that it is
inconsistent with the "intent" of the Founding Fathers (unless one assumes, as a matter of policy, that what occurred in 1787 is incapable of

improvement and ought never to be changed-an assumption upon
which the Founding Fathers themselves did not proceed)." In other
words, potential adversaries of the proposed amendment could not
simply rely on the similar criticism that has been often leveled at the
Supreme Court-that the Court has engaged in "judicial legislation"
when it has upheld acts of Congress that arguably exceed Congress'
bill: 'Should it become law, the amendment would take a long stride by the Federal Government
toward occupying the field of general criminal law and toward exercising a general Federal police
power; and it would permit prosecution in Federal as well as State courts of a typically State
offense.' Id. at 149. In addition, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart:
But under the statute before us a man can be convicted without any proof of interstate
movement, of the use of facilities in interstate commerce, or of facts showing that his
conduct affected interstate commerce. I think the Framers of the Constitution never
intended that the National Government might define as a crime and prosecute such
wholly local activity through the enactment of federal criminal laws.
In order to sustain this law we would, in my view, have to be able at the least to
say that Congress could rationally have concluded that loan sharking is an activity with
interstate attributes which distinguish it in some substantial respect from other local
crime. But it is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime
is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking has interstate
characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate setting.
Id. at 157. If Congress has the power under the commerce clause to provide a uniform substantive
criminal code, it must also have the power to provide a code of criminal procedure. See U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 18.
Principal support for the argument that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment authorizes
Congress to enact a uniform criminal code, or at least a uniform code of criminal procedure, is
found in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal
statute that invalidated a New York statute that had required persons to be literate in English
before they were entitled to vote. The Court upheld the act of Congress without a finding that the
New York act was itself violative of the equal protection clause. In doing so, the Court deferred
to the judgment of Congress that this was essential to the enforcement of the equal protection
clause. Immediately after the case was decided, a leading scholar suggested that "[Ilogical pursuit
of the reasoning in Morgan v. Katzenbach leads to the conclusion that Congress can constitutionally adopt a comprehensive code of criminal procedure applicable to prosecutions in state courts."
Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion
of Human Rights. 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 108 (1966) (footnote omitted).
However, the recent case of Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), may cast some doubt
on the breadth of the principle ennunciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan.

I'M.

FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

207-08 (1913).
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constitutional powers.57 A constitutional amendment is, by definition,
legislation by the ultimate authority, the people.
Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment
Section 1. Congress shall have the power to provide a uniform code
for criminal law, all forms of incarceration (however denominated),
and for the procedures relating thereto, for the United States.
[However, Congress may, in its discretion, apply special criminal law,
criminal procedure, and incarceration provisions to the District of
Columbia, so long as such special provisions do not make possible
longer incarceration or otherwise more severe punishment than would
be possible under the laws applying generally to the United States.] No
law enacted pursuant to this section shall create criminal liability without fault.
The portion of the section enclosed in brackets is thought to be
optional. My personal view is that it would be unnecessary since Congress would be able to experiment without it, and any serious mistakes
would become quickly evident because of the wide geographical application of the federal code. Nevertheless, if it is concluded that some
method of experimentation is needed that does not affect the entire
United States, then this bracketed material would be useful. The District of Columbia seems an appropriate place to experiment because any
experiments could be closely scrutinized by Congress and because it
would be relatively easy to publicize the differences between the law
applicable to the District of Columbia and that applicable to the rest of
the United States.
The last sentence of this section incorporates the moral blameworthiness theory of criminal law and thus would prohibit conviction where
there is no element of fault. This does not mean that ignorance of the
criminal law would be excused, since persons would still be expected to
inform themselves of the content of the law through the exercise of due
diligence. Presumably Congress would be required to take reasonable
steps to publicize the content of this law. 8
Section 2. All criminal law and incarceration proceedings shall be in
the courts of the United States.

"See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
"'See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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This section would insure application of uniform criminal and incarceration procedures and would result in a uniform method for the
selection of the judges who would try criminal and incarceration cases.
Section 3. Review of all criminal law and incarceration proceedings
shall include review by a United States Court of Criminal Appeals of
questions of constitutional law and, if Congress so provides, of statutory interpretation. The Court shall be constituted by the Congress.
There shall be discretionary review of the decisions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving questions of constitutional law and, if Congress so provides, of
statutory interpretation.
A major shift in the responsibilities of the states and the federal
government in the area of criminal law and civil commitment would
require an increase in the number of federal judges. It would seem
desirable not only to increase the total number of judges, but also to
add a new appellate court that could devote its entire attention to the
criminal law and civil commitment. This section is merely illustrative
of the manner in which this might be done and hopefully is flexible
enough to satisfy those interested in reform of the appellate process.59
Section 4. (A) There is hereby created a National Criminal Law
Council composed of one hundred members. Each member shall be
elected from a separate district inhabited by approximately 1/100 of
the population of the United States. The boundaries of each district
shall be determined by the Congress.
Members shall serve a term of eight years and shall be eligible for
re-election. Their salaries shall equal those of the members of the
United States House of Representatives and shall be paid by the
United States Government.
(B) The National Criminal Law Council shall provide the Congress
of the United States with advice and proposals regarding the criminal
law, all forms of incarceration (however denominated), and the procedures relating thereto.
(C) No bill relating to the subjects referred to in subsection (B) shall
become law unless it satisfies the requirements of article I, § 7 of the
Constitution and is not disapproved by two-thirds of the Criminal Law
Council within ten days after it is passed by the Congress.
59

See Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids:Reshaping the JudicialSystem, 44 So. CAL.
L. REV. 901 (1971); Strong, The Time Has Come to Talk of Major Curtailment in the Supreme
Court'sJurisdiction,48 N.C.L. REv. I (1968).
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(D) The National Criminal Law Council shall have the power, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, to require the Congress
to vote on any proposal relating to the subjects referred to in subsection (B). Such vote shall be taken no later than sixty days after the
members of the Council have concurred in the proposal.
The National Criminal Law Council would lighten the additional
burden placed on Congress by providing recommendations and serving
as a source of information. However, in the context of a constitutional
amendment the Council could be much more. It could be the means by
which the power of Congress could be formally restrained. Much of this
section is merely illustrative of the restraints that might be imposed on
Congress if it were given the power to enact an exclusive criminalincarceration code.
There is nothing sacrosanct about the provisions of subsection (A)
relating to the selection and composition of the Council; these provisions are merely designed to create a relatively simple method for the
selection of members of the Council, embodying the one-man-one-vote
principle.
The provisions of subsection (B) delineate the duties of the Council. It is intended that the Council become the primary forum for the
development of the uniform code and that the role of Congress be that
of ratifying the decisions of the Council.
The provisions of subsection (C) give the Council the power to
veto those acts of Congress that are considered not to be in the national
interest. Because a large number of votes are necessary for an exercise
of such power, it is unlikely that the Council would act except under
extreme circumstances. Consequently, the veto of the Council is final.
The language of this subsection is designed to make clear that a
bill must not only have the approval of the President, but also not be
disproved by the Criminal Law Council. At first the language referring
to Article 1, § 7 of the Constitution may seem superfluous; however
without such language it would not be clear whether a bill that was
immediately signed by the President but vetoed by the Council within,
for example, five days after the President's approval was law during the
five days between the President's action and the Council's veto. To
avoid unnecessary confusion such a bill would not become law until the
ten days had passed during which the Council had an opportunity to
decide whether to veto the bill.
It would not be enough to give the Council power to prevent the
passage of unwise legislation, however. Such prevention would not pro-
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vide a remedy if the law remaining after the exercise of a Council veto
were obsolete. Therefore, subsection (D) would permit the Council to
force Congress to act on a specific proposal.
Section 5. Two years after the effective date of this constitutional
amendment, no state, except as it acts as agent for the United States
Government or punishes for contempt committed in open court in the
presence of the presiding judge, shall incarcerate any individual in any
facility, whether the facility be described as a jail, prison, hospital,
training school, or otherwise.
The prohibition contained in this section reflects my presumptions
regarding the importance of personal liberty and the freedom from the
stigmatization associated with criminal incarceration. To protect both
values it is necessary specifically to proscribe all types of incarceration
by the states, however euphemistically described. To those who object
that this prohibition would preclude the enforcement of many regulatory laws, such as liquor laws, my reply is that this result might not be
as bad as imagined. 0 The proposed amendment would not preclude
fines for the violation of state regulations. Certainly if one accepts the
proposition that the criminal law should be a means of imposing social
controls only with respect to morally condemnable conduct, it becomes
questionable whether many of such basically regulatory laws ought to
be enforced through the criminal law.
There are two exceptions to the prohibition against incarceration
explicitly provided for in Section 5. The first would permit the states to
incarcerate individuals if the states acted as agents of the federal government. As a matter of convenience, the federal government might want
the states to continue to operate some or all of the correctional facilities
which the states now operate; this might be particularly true in the
transitional period during which the federal government would have to
adjust to its new responsibilities. The United States Government would
still be able to set standards for the states in the administration of such
facilities.
The second exception relates to the maintenance of order in, and
respect for, the state courts. Contempts committed in open court require
immediate attention if order is to be preserved;6 ' therefore the state
courts would be permitted to continue to exercise this aspect of con6

See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-

107 (1967).
Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 214 (1971) (dictum); see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970).

TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS
6
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tempt power. Federal writs of habeas corpus would still be available to
persons incarcerated in this fashion to protect against abuse of this
power.
Section 6. Nothing contained in this constitutional amendment shall
be construed to deprive the states of their power to levy reasonable
fines against individuals or other legal entities for the violation of
regulatory statutes not superceded by the uniform code, so long as
there is no concomitant deprivation of any civil right or liberty, including but not limited to the right to vote, the right to hold public office,
and the liberty to hold private office. In any action to collect a fine
permitted by this section, if lack of knowledge of the regulation allegedly violated is reasonably raised by the evidence, the state must assume the burden of persuasion with respect to that issue.
This section would insure that the states have sufficient power to
enforce their regulatory statutes through the levying of fines. However,
to insure that the states would not attempt indirectly to punish individuals other than by way of fine, it would be necessary to attempt to place
some additional restrictions on the states. The states would not be allowed to attach employment disqualifications to the violations of their
laws, since such disqualifications so frequently amount to serious punishment. If a person is to be denied a means of livelihood, the matter is
sufficiently serious to be adjudicated by the government which has the
responsibility for enforcement of the criminal laws-the federal government.
The states would also not be permitted to determine the circumstances under which a person could lose the right to vote, the right to
hold public office, or other civil rights or liberties. It is hoped that the
language employed here would be sufficiently flexible to permit the
courts to deal with ingenious devices intended to subvert the principle
announced in this section.
The last sentence of this section draws a distinction which initially
may seem hard to justify. It would permit, in effect, the defense of lack
of knowledge of state law, but would not permit the defendant to escape
the payment of a fine if he knew the law but was nevertheless unable to
adhere to it. Such a distinction is justified because defense of lack of
knowledge is necessary if transients are to be protected against laws
which they could not reasonably be expected to know.6 2 However, since
62

See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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imprisonment would not be involved, it might be desirable to permit the
states to encourage the greatest degree of care in certain areas by imposing a form of strict liability on those who have advance warning of the
regulations to which they are expected to adhere. This is analogous to
of fines on railroads under the Federal Safety Appliance
the imposition
3
Acts.
One may ask whether a requirement that the state prove knowledge
of the regulations allegedly violated when lack of knowledge is raised
imposes too great a burden on the state. Here it is necessary to balance
the additional burden placed on the states with the lack of fairness to
the defendant that would result from the imposition of monetary penalties without knowledge of a regulation. Knowledge could be established,
in the absence of an admission by the defendant, by adducing evidence
from which one could reasonably infer such knowledge. The extent of
the burden on the state would depend on the degree to which the state
had publicized the regulations which people were expected to observe.
For example, in the area of traffic regulations, if such regulations were
posted on traffic signs, published in books widely distributed, published
in newspapers, or publicized on television, the burden on the state would
not be great. Lack of knowledge would always be available as a defense,
but a jury or judge would not readily accept a defendant's denial of
knowledge in the face of evidence of such wide publication. Nevertheless, the existence of such a defense would serve as substantial encouragement to the states to publicize widely laws that differed from those
enforced in other states.
Section 7. [Insert here a provision incorporating some form of merit
system for the selection of all federal judges.]

The problem of judicial selection and training deserves fuller consideration than can be given in this article. Perhaps it is sufficient here
to raise the issue and to suggest consideration of some form of merit
selection-perhaps patterned after the "Missouri Plan"" 4-for the federal system.
Section 8. Two years after the effective date of this constitutional
amendment, if Congress shall have failed to adopt a uniform code for
criminal law, all forms of incarceration (however denominated), and
-45 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
"MO. CONST. art. 5, §§ 29(a)-(g), 30, 31; see Allard, Application of the Missouri Court Plan
to Judicial Selection and Tenure in America Today, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 378 (1965).
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for procedures relating thereto, the law of the District of Columbia
dealing with these matters shall become operative throughout the
United States and shall remain so operative until Congress shall adopt
such a uniform code.
Since it is possible that Congress would not succeed in enacting a
federal code during the two-year interval between adoption of the
amendment and the effective date of the prohibitions of state action
contained in Section 5, some provision would have to be made for this
contingency. The simplest method seems to be to provide for the application of the relevant laws of the District of Columbia to the rest of the
country until such laws were amended or repealed by the Congress.
Section 9.

Congress shall have the power to enforce this amendment

by appropriate legislation.
Although one can argue that this section would be unnecessary in
the light of the necessary and proper clause of article one, section eight
of the Constitution, it might be wise to include this express grant of
power; otherwise, someone might maintain that since such language has
been used in other amendments, the failure to use such language is
legally significant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If one looks to the current literature dealing with problems of
federalism, he may gain the impression that despite the effects of travel,
migration, and the mass media on the American people, the criminal
law is the last area in which many persons would advocate enforced
uniformity among the states; the predominant feeling still seems to be
that the criminal law is largely a matter of local concern, despite the
apparent absence of significant relationship between attitudes towards
crime and state boundaries. Nevertheless, as one who values physical
liberty as well as freedom from unwarranted moral condemnation by
society and would place those liberties toward the top of any hierarchy
of values, I believe that uniformity in the laws dealing with crime and
incarceration must be achieved. Only through uniformity of such laws
can the evils of lack of fair notice of the criminal laws and arbitrary
application of different criminal and civil commitment laws be eliminated.
I believe also that the attempt to bring about uniformity should be
made only through a constitutional amendment and not through an act
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of Congress. Even though the idea of uniformity may not be popular
now, I believe that people will respond more favorably to it if the
attempt to change the system is made forthrightly in the manner constitutionally prescribed for constitutional change.
The problem is one of convincing most Americans of the validity
of the conclusions set forth above regarding the need for uniformity. In
view of present attitudes, the possibility that most Americans will be
thus convinced in the near future seems slight. But if this proposal has
merit, if it or a more refined one would make possible a better system
of criminal law, then I believe that eventually it will be possible to
persuade the American people that such changes ought to be made. The
American system of government is based on the assumption that such
changes are possible.

